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Sex Discrimination in Life and Law
Diane P. Woodt
The law of sex discrimination is hardly an innovation of the
last decade of the 20th century. Depending on how broadly we
define it, it began in the mid-19th century with the efforts of the
pioneer women's rights advocates, or in 1920, when the Nine.-
teenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (guaranteeing
women the right to vote) took effect, or in 1964, with the enact.-
ment of the Civil Rights Act.1 In that light, perhaps the most
amazing thing about this area of the law is how poorly under..
stood it remains after so many years of development.
Nonetheless, poorly understood it is. There is much that peo..
ple fail to understand at the most basic level. This lack of com..
prehension in turn has subtle effects on the current development
of the law in the courts. Paradoxically, it has led to an odd form of
"progress": the further we go, the more unclear some of the core
concepts have become. This is so despite the fact that after all the!
theory is written and the talking stops, real people have continu.-
ally tested the law in real litigation. That litigation, as we all
know, reached the Supreme Court during October Term 1997 in
four pivotal cases: Faragher v City of Boca Raton,2 Burlington,
Industries v Ellerth,3 Gebser v Lago Vista Independent School
District,4 and Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.5 More
t Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Senior Lecturer in
Law, The University of Chicago Law School. This speech is based on a transcript of re.-
marks delivered at the University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, November 13-14.,
1998. Although edited for publication, this paper retains the informal format of the origi..
nal venue.
1 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253 (1964), codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
2 118 S Ct 2275 (1998) (holding employers vicariously liable for the actionable hos..
tile environment created by a supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority
over the employee and setting forth an affirmative defense if no tangible employment
action is taken).
' 118 S Ct 2257 (1998) (holding that agency principles govern sexual harassment
claims, regardless of whether the discrimination stems from a quid pro quo or a hostile
environment claim).
4 118 S Ct 1989 (1998) (holding that agency principles govern sexual harassment
claims, regardless of whether the discrimination stems from a quid pro quo or a hostile
environment claim).
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Supreme Court attention is on the way, in Davis v Monroe County
Board of Education,6 which raises the question whether a school
district will be liable in a private action under Title IX for stu-
dent-to-student acts of sexual harassment.7
It is worth asking how much we have learned, how much we
must now unlearn, and how much remains to be considered, in
the wake of those cases and other relatively recent pronounce-
ments from the Court that affect the law of sex discrimination. (I
am thinking, for example, of cases like United States v Virginia,'
better known as the VMI case, and J.E.B. v Alabama,9 which ex-
tended the rule in Batson v Kentucky"° prohibiting racially dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges to prospective jurors to per-
emptory challenges infected by sex discrimination.) By way of
introduction to this Symposium, this paper takes as its starting
point the experiential world and moves from there to the legal
world - in a sense, proceeding from the general to the particular.
The real-world experience of discrimination ultimately must be
translated into legal categories, and I will consider how success-
fully that has been done. I then turn to more specific doctrinal
issues. From every vantage point, we will see that there is still a
great deal of work to be done - a point that I am certain will re-
lieve the participants in tomorrow's panels, since there is no need
for them to shred their papers, pack up, and go home.
I. EXPERIENCING SEX DISCRIMINATION
In My Fair Lady," the Lerner & Lowe Broadway play based
on George Bernard Shaw's Pygmalion" (loosely inspired in turn
by the Greek myth about the eponymous character), Henry Hig-
gins has a wonderful song - almost rapped, if we think of his
style and use an anachronistic term - in which he asks "Why
' 523 US 75 (1998) (holding that Title VII does not bar same-sex sexual harassment
claims).
c 120 F3d 1390 (11th Cir 1997) (en banc), revd, 119 S Ct 1661 (1999).
Davis was decided after this speech was given. See 119 S Ct 1661 (1999). The
Court held that a private damages action may lie under Title IX for student-on-student
harassment where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference and the harass-
ment is so severe that it effectively deprives the victim of access to the educational oppor-
tunity or benefit.
' 518 US 515 (1996) (finding Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of women from
citizen-soldier program to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
511 US 127 (1994).
10 476 US 79 (1986).
Frederick Lowe and Alan Jay Lerner, My Fair Lady (Chappell 1969).
12 Bernard Shaw, Androcles and the Lion, Overruled, Pygmalion (Brentano's 1916).
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Can't a Woman Be More Like a Man?" 3 (Higgins sings the song
just after Eliza Doolittle has walked out on him, angry with his
selfish failure to acknowledge her hard work in her language
studies and her pivotal role in winning his bet for him.) Utterly
befuddled about the inner workings of a woman's mind, Higgins
laments, "Straightening up their hair is all they ever do. Why
don't they straighten up the mess that's inside?""' He compares
women's behavior quite unfavorably first to that of all men in
general and then to that of his friend Colonel Pickering; he con-
cludes the song with a flourish by asking, "Why can't a woman be
more like ME?"'5 On a similar note, it has now become fashion-
able for industry behavior experts and students of male-female
relationships to observe that women and men essentially speak
different languages. From this fact, they argue, workplace mis-
understandings arise, women (assumed to be subordinate) see
their accomplishments undervalued and their management skills
overlooked by their presumptively male superiors, and the glass
ceiling remains firmly in place. Companies fear liability for sex-
ual harassment based on "mere" misunderstandings; they criti-
cize the only alternative they see: a rigid, humorless, and unk-
friendly environment in which no one dares even to crack a smile
directed toward a person of the opposite sex - or for that matter
the same sex - as both too grim and too unenforceable to toler-
ate.
Why is this? Surely the people who have been working for
years to eliminate sex discrimination - a century and a half, or a
generation and a half, depending on where you want to enter the
story - have not been pursuing a single-minded goal to eliminate
all friendly interaction between men and women. I personally do
not know any women who feel offended by a kind gesture if --
and here is an important caveat - it is intended as nothing more
than a courtesy and both parties understand clearly that there is
no hidden agenda. No, our first problem is that the terms of the
sex discrimination debate still reflect to an alarming degree the
failure to communicate and the insistence on a male perspective
so aptly and humorously illustrated by our friend Henry Higgins.
(We see a reflection of this issue in the debate over the appropri.-
ate perspective for workplace discrimination actions: should it be
the reasonable "person," the reasonable "woman," or the reason-
Lowe and Lemer at 216 (cited in note 11).
" Id at 223.
1 Id at 224.
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able "victim"? Surely not the reasonable "man," no matter what
people who still think of the word "man" as generic for "human"
might say.)
The dominant model, I suggest, is still subconsciously based
upon the supposition that women should be more like men. Even
more regrettably, many women set exactly this task for them-
selves: "I, too, can be a 'rat' at VMI, I, too, can work ten hours a
day even though I'm pregnant and the men aren't; I, too, can in-
timidate opposing counsel with the best of them." Furthermore,
accounts of discrimination offered by women are too often implic-
itly measured by a male standard. The befuddlement those ac-
cused of discrimination often express is genuine in a substantial
number of cases. (I hasten to add that there is no reason to be-
lieve every tale of discrimination either: whether we are talking
about sex discrimination, or discrimination based on other pro-
tected characteristics such as race, national origin, age, disabil-
ity, or religion, any judge or experienced litigator will confirm the
fact that disappointed people regularly blame a well deserved fate
on their membership in some group, instead of taking personal
responsibility where they should.)
But all cases begin with a story: a story told by the potential
plaintiff about something that happened to her that she believes
may have violated her legal rights. Who hears those stories? Who
believes them? What difference does it make if someone thinks
they are plausible or not? On what will the listener draw in
making that crucial initial determination? And most importantly
of all, which stories reveal the existence of something we should
recognize as sex discrimination, and which do not?
First, consider the law against which any responsible lawyer
will measure the plaintiff's story. No matter how many women
we now have in state legislatures and the Congress, and no mat-
ter how many women now sit on the state and federal benches,
we would all agree that gains in this area have been recent. (I
was the second woman appointed to the Seventh Circuit, and my
dear friend Ilana Rovner, the first one, joined the court only in
1992 - hardly ancient history.) Law, as we all know, is a conser-
vative discipline, at least outside of the law schools. The United
States follows a quasi-common law approach to the development
and application of even statutory law, by which I mean that case
law plays an important role in giving content to broad statutory
declarations and (to a lesser degree because of Chevron
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deference") to regulatory regimes. At the constitutional level, of
course, case law emanating ultimately from the Supreme Court is
almost the whole ball game.
Who created that law, which I remind you must be followed
under principles of stare decisis? In a word, men. Now you well
might ask - indeed, you have an obligation to ask - why that
should make any difference. I, at least, have nothing whatsoever
against men - some of my best friends are men, as the saying
goes, and I have spent the entirety of my legal career working
with men, many of whom have been brilliant lawyers, sensitive
individuals, and committed soldiers in the battle against dis-
crimination of every stripe. But there is still an experiential gap
between the finest man and the average woman when it comes to
sex discrimination. This gap has a profound effect on the lawyer's
initial evaluation of our plaintiff's account of suspected discrimi-
nation. It also has an impact on a trial judge's assessment of a
record, when a discrimination case reaches the summary judg-
ment stage. At that point, the judge needs to decide whether the
plaintiff has presented any "genuine issue as to any material
fact" that would justify a trial.7 Invariably in discrimination
cases a crucial part of the plaintiff's evidence will be her own affi-
davit, setting forth whatever it was that she believes was dis-
criminatory or harassing. Even though we all know that judges
are not supposed to make credibility determinations at that
stage, the judge is free to decide questions like whether the con-
duct about which the plaintiff complained was severe and perva-
sive harassment or merely an "isolated incident," whether subtle
differences in treatment between the plaintiff and co-workers or
others "rose to the level" of discrimination, or whether the plain-
tiff has even identified a category associated enough with sex tA
come under the protection of the laws banning sex discrimination.
Over the last fifteen years or so, we have seen an interactive
process through which the victims of sex discrimination have be-
come more willing to tell their stories in their own words, from
their own point of view. Slowly but surely, they are resisting the
urge to conform their actions in the workplace, the school, or the
family, to the old socially constructed norms. They are complain-
ing about actions that genuinely hurt them, or are genuinely of-
fensive, even if they were raised to "grin and bear it," or as one
" See Chevron U.S.A Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837
(1984) (allowing regulatory agencies the freedom to interpret ambiguous statutes and
requiring courts to defer to the administration's interpretations).
" FRCP 56(c).
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federal judge put it, to "wriggle past" someone who annoyingly
persists in groping. 8 There is a good reason why a woman doesn't
want to be "more like a man," and I'm not talking only of our
Gallic friends' zest for la difference. Lawyers and courts have be-
gun to hear about discrimination problems from the victim's
viewpoint, whether that victim be female, male, gay, or multi-
categorical. One result of this is that this subset of discrimination
is starting to become more visible to the world at large. You
might think I have just referred to a euphemism for the male
world, but that is not what I meant. As books ranging from Betty
Friedan's The Feminine Mystique"8 to Simone de Beauvoir's The
Second Sex20 illustrate poignantly, women too were unaware that
their individual experiences were part of a much larger picture. It
has only been gradually, as victims of sex discrimination began to
realize the nature of the phenomenon and their right to insist on
its abolition, that courts have had to confront their stories within
a recognized legal framework.
That's the good news. The bad news is that many of these
stories are still falling on deaf, or partially deaf, ears. Many in
our society, including some judges, do not yet have as firm an in-
tuitive grasp of sex discrimination as they do of other forms of
discrimination. Consider the random person's instant reaction to
race discrimination or religious discrimination with the same
person's reaction to sex discrimination: that person will perceive
an obvious case of race discrimination, but she may miss just as
obvious a case of sex discrimination. Take the infamous letter
Congressman Passman wrote to Shirley Davis, which saw the
light of day in the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v
Passman.2 In that letter, you will recall, the Congressman
frankly told Davis that he was not going to consider her for the
position of deputy administrative assistant in his office, because,
as he put it, "I concluded that it was essential that the under-
study to my Administrative Assistant be a man."22 We are talking
about a letter written in July of 1974 - a time I certainly can
remember, since I had by then finished two years of law school.
People would have been flabbergasted at that late date if the
Congressman had casually told a job applicant that it was "essen-
tial" that the applicant be White, or Protestant. Even the most
See Hennessy v Penril Datacom Networks, Inc, 69 F3d 1344, 1353 (7th Cir 1995).
Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (Norton 1974).
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Knopf 1957) (H.M. Parshley, ed and trans).
22 442 US 228 (1979).
Id at 230 n3.
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN LIFE AND LAW
benighted amongst us realized by then that such preferences
were inappropriate and had to be kept under wraps. (That obvi-
ously led and leads to a different set of problems, but my point
here is about basic awareness that sex discrimination exists and
is wrong.) Even today, it often brings people up short if one asks
them to substitute the word "race" in a statement about sex. As
other speakers will explore in greater detail, the new challenge is
to decide which model of non-discrimination or equality - two
potentially different things - one wants for sex, and whether the
Constitution and statutes demand the same treatment for sex as
they require for race. (I put to one side for the moment the spe-
cific Title VII notion of a "bona fide occupational qualification"
("BFOQ"),2 which can justify a policy that draws explicit lines
based on sex, and assume for the moment that we are considering
something that would not qualify as a BFOQ.)
Before we have any idea what kinds of laws we want or how
those laws should be administered, we should know as much as
possible about the problem the law should be addressing. In the
case of sex discrimination, that has been more difficult than you
might imagine. Even to brand certain behavior as discriminatory,
as opposed to simply reflective of the differences between the
sexes, is a major step, and one about which debate continues to
rage both at a general level and with respect to countless par-
ticulars. So, having laid that problem at the feet of our Sympo-
sium speakers, I will move on to my next topic: What are the
relevant legal categories, and have we achieved any degree of
consensus about their meaning?
II. LITIGATING SEX DISCRIMINATION
Here, too, we find more confusion than clarity. At this mo-
ment, I could not even tell you with any confidence what "sex" is,
when it comes to applying the laws that concern sex discrimina-
tion. There are a number of competing definitions for the legal
meaning of "sex" in these laws.2' A few examples suffice to make
the point.
42 USC § 2000e-2, 3 (1994).
' And if it seems jarring to think that legal "sei" might be different from ordinary
sex, it is worth recalling that these kinds of anomalies are not restricted to the law of
discrimination. In the area governing worker benefits to former coal miners suffering from
Black Lung disease, for example, administrative agencies and courts draw a distinction
between medical pneumoconiosis and "legal" pneumoconiosis, with the latter encompass-
ing a significantly broader group of ailments than the former, for a variety of social policy
8 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1999:
"Sex" might refer only to the observable physical characteris-
tics that divide up the world into two genders, biological anoma-
lies such as hermaphroditism to one side. Or the idea of sex
might carry with it the associated behaviors that society expects
from persons of each gender, including our concepts of masculin-
ity and femininity. Or "sex" may include an idea of sexuality,
such that an issue concerning sex discrimination does not arise
unless some kind of libidinous behavior is occurring. Although
some statutes draw a line between "sex" and "sexual orientation,"
it is probable that they do so because courts have not tradition-
ally understood the term "sex" to encompass issues relating to
sexual orientation. Yet it is easy to see how the two ideas are at
least closely related, if not overlapping or coincident.
This is not the only area of discrimination law in which
membership in a protected group is not always obvious. While the
scope of certain protected categories, such as race, national ori-
gin, and religion, is normally clear, and (evidentiary problems to
one side) it should be easy enough to determine whether someone
is in the age group protected by the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act' (which kicks in at a sprightly 40 years old), the
same is emphatically not true of the newer Americans with Dis-
abilities Act ("ADA")." What a disability is, who is disabled, and
how disabled the person is, are questions that arise in nearly
every case." The category "sex" falls somewhere between the still-
unsettled idea of "disabled" and the more well established catego-
ries of race and religion. It is possible, interestingly enough, that
we may be moving away from certainty rather than toward it in
the area of race, as people begin to question the old assumptions
about how people of racially mixed heritage should be classified.
Lack of a clear vision about the scope of the category leads to
questions like the following, all of which I have heard posed: (1)
Can a man who has an entirely female workforce - perhaps
reasons. See Doris Coal v Director, OWCP, 938 F2d 492 (4th Cir 1991); Hobbs v Clinch-
field Coal Co, 917 F2d 790, 791 n 1 (4th Cir 1990).
29 USC §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp 1996).
42 USC §§ 12101-213 (1994).
The Supreme Court threw some light on those questions in the trio of cases it
decided in October Term 1998: Murphy v United Parcel Service, 119 S Ct 2133 (1999)
(holding that whether a person is disabled for purposes of the Act must be determined
with reference to mitigating measures, and holding that being regarded as disabled from
performing a single job is not enough to satisfy the statute); Sutton v United Airlines, Inc,
119 S Ct 2139 (1999) (holding that corrective and mitigating measures should be consid-
ered in deciding whether someone is disabled under the ADA); and Albertson's, Inc v Kirk-
ingburg, 119 S Ct 2162 (1999) (holding that monocular vision did not automatically "sub-
stantially limit" an individual's major life activities).
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some kind of clothing assembly plant - be guilty of discriminat-
ing on the basis of sex when he promotes one individual over an-
other? (2) What if the owner of the plant is a woman? Does it
make any sense to allow a claim of sex discrimination to proceed
against her? (3) Do gays and lesbians suffer from de jure sex dis-
crimination when they are told that they may not marry, solely
because of their sex? And if not, why not? (4) Does the "equal op-
portunity" discriminator, who viciously harasses men and women
alike in the workplace, but whose methods involve sexual themes
(for example, groping the women, exposing himself, etc., and
threatening homosexual rape of the men), violate the law?
Whatever lack of clarity there is in the term "sex" when we
think of proscriptions against sex discrimination, it is nothing in
comparison to the confusion that abounds with respect to the no-
tion of "discrimination" in this area. Is "discrimination" just the
ffip side of equality, or does an anti-discrimination principle
evoke something different from the norm of equal treatment? Is
equality itself the same thing as equal treatment, or does it mean
more? In one fashion or another, most of the participants in this
Symposium will touch on this question. Even if we think we know
what discrimination means, at what point do we measure its in-
cidence? Right now, when a claim of discrimination is made, it is
made against a particular party - an employer, a university, a
state actor - and we hold that party responsible only for any dis-
criminatory behavior in which it has engaged. If it refused to hire
someone because she lacked the necessary qualifications, we do
not ask why she lacked those qualifications, and we do not blame
the employer for failings in the education system or discrimina-
tory decisions of earlier employers. Indeed, as Personnel Adminis-
trator of Massachusetts v Feeney' demonstrated, qualifications
that everyone knows will inevitably exclude most female job ap-
plicants are nevertheless legal under constitutional standards,
even if the reason that they have such a severe exclusionary ef-
fect stems from discrimination or unequal treatment of women.
While I can readily see the problems with the kind of "tunnel
vision" approach to discrimination claims I have just described,
and I recognize that this kind of "take your woman as you find
her" attitude may leave many forms of discriminatory treatment
unredressed, I fear that a host of different problems would attend
- 442 US 256, 259, 275, 281 (1979) (upholding a Massachusetts veterans preference
statute that "operates overwhelmingly to the advantage of males" because the statute was
not "a pretext for preferring men over women" and did not "in any way reflect[ ] a purpose
to discriminate on the basis of sex").
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any different system. I do not mean to make a frivolous analogy
here, but the picture that comes to my mind when I consider a
system that holds present actors liable for the consequences of
discrimination, no matter when they occurred, is of a Title VII
equivalent to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act,' better known as CERCLA. As
those of you with an interest in environmental law will know,
CERCLA uses an exceptionally broad notion of "potentially re-
sponsible parties," or "PRPs."30 Not only is the present owner of a
contaminated facility responsible for cleaning it up, whether that
person so much as spilled a cup of coffee on the ground, but prior
owners whose activities led to the problem, people who arranged
for shipments to the property, and a host of others can also be
held responsible. The statute then permits the parties to shift
responsibility among themselves by means of contribution ac-
tions.31 In that way, the hypothetical innocent landowner to
which I just referred should not be left holding the bag, while the
guilty party (who may have been operating as long ago as a cen-
tury earlier) goes free.
Playing the devil's advocate for a moment, I suppose one
could say that human beings are at least as important as parcels
of land, and that anyone who contributed to their devaluation by
means of discriminatory action should be required to participate
in the "remediation," to use another jargonish word borrowed
from CERCLA. But I would not favor such a system, even though
I deplore the social and personal cost that discrimination inflicts
upon its victims. The sources of discrimination and devaluation of
women run so deep into society's fabric that the threshold prob-
lem of identifying scapegoats is practically insurmountable. At
least under CERCLA we know which questions to ask, and we
can do our best to find accurate answers. Who owned the land?
Did they pollute it somehow? When? Not so for sex discrimina-
tion. Schools, churches, parents limited by their own vision of the
role of women, peers, and -the mass media all appear to play some
role in shaping our daughters' self-images. I will never forget lis-
tening to a conversation at a birthday party for one of my daugh-
ters when she was about eight years old. The topic was the im-
portance of college, and one little girl solemnly announced to the
table that girls had to go to college to find a husband.
42 USC §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp 1996).
30 42 USC § 9604 (1994).
" 42 USC § 9607(27) (1994).
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ANATHEMA! I thought. I am happy to say that neither one of my
daughters seems to have any use for that school of thought today,
now that one is a freshman in college and the other a freshman in
high school, but it shows how utterly impossible it would be to try
to root out with the tools of the legal system, using a litigation
model, every contributor to the disadvantages a woman experi-
ences in adult life. Far more productive, I believe, are the efforts
to think about the way sex discrimination manifests itself in the
educational community, and the creative experiments that are
designed to overcome its effects.
Even if we abandon thoughts of trying to stretch the concept
of discrimination to reach those subtle disadvantages women face
in the workplace, such as lack of qualifications, allegedly ineffec-
tive methods of communicating with co-workers, and the like,
problems still arise when we try to think of how "equal" treat-
ment should be assured for situations that at a common sense
level appear to be unequal. Pregnancy discrimination is the ex-
ample that comes most readily to mind. As we know, Congress
decided to require that pregnancy be treated exactly the same as
all other temporary medical conditions when it passed the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act ("PDA7)"2 in 1978. About ten years
later, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the PDA actually
prohibited more favorable treatment of pregnant women than
other temporarily disabled employees, when state law singled out
pregnancy for special consideration. In California Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association v Guerra,' the Court concluded that the
PDA had no such preemptive effect. I do not want at this juncture
to wade into the debate about affirmative action, but it seems to
me that if pregnancy is really just like a broken leg, and if only
women can get pregnant, then there were elements in Guerra
suggesting that the concept of sex discrimination was not so rigid
as to prohibit all distinctions based on sex, or favorable treatment
for one sex or another when conditions warranted.' I would also
like to put to rest once and for all the notion expressed in the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Geduldig v Aiello,' and General Elec-
42 USC § 2000e(k) (1994).
479 US 272 (1987).
Id at 287 ("[If Congress had intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it would
have been the height of understatement to say only that the legislation would not require
such conduct. It is hardly conceivable that Congress would have extensively discussed
only its intent not to require preferential treatment if in fact it had intended to prohibit
such treatment.").
417 US 484 (1974).
12 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [ 1999:
tric Co v Gilbert,6 that a distinction based on pregnancy is not
"sex-based."37 As it happened, I was in the courtroom the day the
Court handed down Gilbert. Then-Justice Rehnquist, the author
of the opinion, announced it from the bench and, as was custom-
ary, gave a brief summary of the holding. When he got to the part
about pregnancy distinctions not being "sex-based," a spontane-
ous guffaw spread through the marble courtroom. Whatever else
one might want to say about insurance plans, actuarial tables,
observable differences between men as a group and women as a
group, and so on, it is indeed laughable to think that a classifica-
tion system based on pregnancy is not at the most fundamental
level a sex-based system. (Interestingly, years later in UAW v
Johnson Controls, Inc,8 the Court found a paternalistic rule for-
bidding pregnant or fertile women to work in a dangerous facility
incompatible with Title VII. Since even the company agreed that
not all women are fertile,39 this holding seems clearly to give the
Geduldig notion a well deserved burial.)
If the two core concepts in the law about sex discrimination
are unclear - what is sex, and at least for purposes of sex, what
is discrimination - where does that leave us? It leaves us, in a
word, with the traditional concepts with which a precedential
legal system is comfortable. The Supreme Court's decisions in
October Term 1997 illustrate both how incremental change oc-
curs in such a system, and how much thinking remains to be
done. Let us turn, therefore, to a brief look at the 1997 Quartet:
Faragher v City of Boca Raton," Burlington Industries v Ellerth,41
Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc,42 and Gebser v Lago
Vista Independent School District."3
III. APPLYING CURRENT SEx DISCRIMINATION LAW
It is no accident that all of these cases dealt in one way or
another with one of the cutting edge issues in the law of sex dis-
crimination, namely, sexual harassment. I doubt the Court would
have needed to grant certiorari in a case where an employer lit-
erally or figuratively hung out a sign saying "women need not
429 US 125 (1976).
See, for example, id at 135.
499 US 187 (1991).
Id at 191.
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
41 118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
42 523 US 274 (1998).
, 118 S Ct 1989 (1998).
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apply," or "young mothers not welcome." Even though United
States v Virginia44 concerned the constitutional dimension of this
kind of behavior, the message the Court sent there was unmis-
takable: apart from the narrow, EEOC-sanctioned distinctions
that permit insistence on a woman for a wet nurse or a man for a
sperm donor, forget explicit classifications based on sex that will
not qualify as a BFOQ under the narrow strictures established in
Dothard v Rawlinson.5 So what the Court found worthy of its
attention was the vexing subset of sex discrimination known as
sexual harassment: vexing because the lower courts were strug-
gling with the legal rules governing it; vexing because of the
complex social issues it implicates; and vexing because the per-
ennial question whether a plaintiff has presented enough evi-
dence to survive summary judgment is especially difficult in
these cases.
Anyone who wonders what issues might have been churning
around in the lower courts before the Supreme Court spoke has
only to look at the 203-page tome produced by the judges of the
Seventh Circuit en banc in Burlington Industries v Ellerth to get
a good idea.4 Recall that Ellerth47 and Faragher v City of Boca
Raton' both were limited to the problem of sexual harassment on
the part of a supervisor against a subordinate employee. It is in-
teresting to speculate about the effect of the Supreme Court's de-
cisions on the related problems of co-worker harassment and har-
assment by customers or third-party business associates, but for
now we can restrict ourselves to the supervisory harassment sce-
nario before the Court. Among the issues debated by the Seventh
Circuit were the following fundamental questions, not all of
which were answered clearly by the Supreme Court's opinions:
Should there be a difference, for purposes of "employer" liability
for the acts of a supervisor, between so-called quid pro quo har-
assment and so-called hostile environment harassment - a dis-
tinction first suggested in Catharine MacKinnon's pathbreaking
book two decades earlier,49 and which by the mid-1990s had taken
on near-talismanic importance? Given the fact that the courts
" 518 US 515 (1996)
' 433 US 321 (1977) (recognizing the narrowness of the BFOQ doctrine, yet uphold-
ing Alabama statute prohibiting female guards at correctional institutions based on the
extremely high degree of danger).
, See Jansen v Packaging Corp of America, 123 F3d 490 (7th Cir 1997) (en banc),
affd as Burlington Industries v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
47 118 S Ct at 2280.
S118 S Ct at 2262.
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (Yale 1979).
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had already resolved the question whether the supervisor himself
could be found liable under Title VII, and that the answer to that
question was no, another question was under what principles of
law would one hold the ultimate employer responsible for the su-
pervisor's misdeeds? The Supreme Court had pointed the lower
courts to the law of agency in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vin-
son,'o but it had not specified whether it meant a federal common
law of agency or a borrowing of state agency principles, nor had it
revealed whether a deed like sexual harassment might never-
theless fall within the scope of someone's employment, by analogy
to the driver of a delivery truck who has a crash and is still con-
sidered to be acting within the scope of his employment notwith-
standing the employer's obvious disapproval of his reckless driv-
ing. Yet another question was whether a victim of sexual har-
assment could recover only if she could point to a "tangible job
detriment" that resulted from her mistreatment, and a subsidiary
question was what might count as a tangible job detriment. Pro-
cedural issues abounded as well, including the important ques-
tion whether a person complaining of sexual harassment had to
pigeonhole her complaint into the "quid pro quo" or "hostile envi-
ronment" categories from the EEOC on forward, or if it was
enough simply to set forth the facts forming the basis of her com-
plaint and leave refinement of legal theory to a later stage. Some
judges wondered why these categories should drive legal analysis
under a statute that bans sex discrimination, rather than mis-
treatment on account of sex.51 And, looking at the problem from
the company's side, the court struggled with how great a legal
responsibility a company has to monitor the behavior of its su-
pervisors, with whether a company could inoculate itself against
sex harassment liability if it had a policy forbidding such behav-
ior, and with whether an employee should be barred from recov-
ering anything if she failed to "mitigate her damages," or if fail-
ure to use a policy was relevant if at all only to the amount of
- 477 US 57, 72 (1986) ("[W]e do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts
to look to agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common-law principles
may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define
'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer surely evinces an intent to place some
limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held respon-
sible.") (citation omitted).
" See, for example, Jansen, 123 F3d at 555, 556 (1997) (opinion of Easterbrook); id at
567 (opinion of Diane P. Wood, joined by Easterbrook and Rovner); see also Ellerth, 118 S
Ct at 2264 (1998) (seven members of the Supreme Court reiterating that the question in
harassment cases is "whether the conduct in question constituted discrimination in the
terms of conditions of employment in violation of Title VII").
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damages she might recover. Many of the same issues were before
the Eleventh Circuit in Faragher.52
For me as a lower court judge, it was nothing short of fasci-
nating to see how the Supreme Court handled Ellerth and
Faragher. To begin with, I was quite surprised that the Court
decided to grant certiorari in Ellerth, because at that time it al-
ready had Faragher on its docket, and it had been my supposition
that it would decide Faragher as it saw fit and remand Ellerth to
our court if the need arose. But there was some clue to its deci-
sion in the fact that it limited the grant of certiorari in Ellerth to
an apparently narrow question: whether an employee who re-
fuses the unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a super-
visor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can re-
cover against the employer on a quid pro quo theory absent a
showing of employer negligence or fault." One might have de-
scribed Faragher the same way, in that the plaintiff there did not
rest her case on the existence of a tangible job detriment apart
from the indignity of having to suffer through her supervisor's
crude and unwanted advances day in and day out. But Faragher
reached the court as a fairly conventional hostile environment
case, while Ellerth had aspects of both a quid pro quo theory and
a hostile environment theory. The question on which the Court
granted certiorari therefore signaled that it was going to consider
how far one could go with a quid pro quo theory, when the "quo"
was hard to identify.5'
As we all know, that is not quite what the Court ultimately
did with the case. One way of answering the narrow question on
which it granted certiorari was to jettison the distinction between
quid pro quo cases and hostile environment cases altogether, and
then answer the question. That is the step the Court took. It ex-
pressly stated that "[tihe terms quid pro quo and hostile work
environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarca-
tion between cases in which threats are carried out and those
where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are
of limited utility."5" It then went on to hold squarely that agency
principles, created as a matter of federal law, governed the ques-
tion of employer liability, and that the agency analysis would not
vary depending on the type of discrimination suffered.56 Looking
2111 F3d 1530 (11th Cir 1997), revd, 118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2264.
Id.
" Id.
" Id at 2265.
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for guidance to the Restatement (Second) of Agency law, the
Court concluded that acts of sexual harassment by a supervisor
fall within the narrow category of conduct outside the scope of
employment where the principal, or employer, will nonetheless be
liable, when the supervisor is aided in his misconduct by the
agency relation.57 That will virtually always be the case when the
supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the sub-
ordinate, such as "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing
a significant change in benefits."' In these situations, the injury
could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation, and the
Court therefore found employer liability appropriate.59 Turning to
the cases in which the employee cannot point to a job detriment
that is so visible - the person whose life is made miserable from
day to day, but who still gets her paychecks and raises on time,
and whose assignments are not affected enough to matter - the
Court exercised considerable creativity in crafting its new federal
common law. Responding to the employer community's pleas
about the importance of policies forbidding sexual harassment,
and perhaps also concerned about creating a disincentive to adopt
and enforce such policies, the Court turned away slightly from its
focus on the way that the agency relationship facilitated the in-
jury. Instead, it said that an employer would also be subject to
vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile environ-
ment, but that the employer could raise a new affirmative de-
fense with two elements."M It would have to show (1) that "the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and [(2)] that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer
or to avoid harm otherwise." 1 This is the same approach, as Jus-
tice Ginsburg emphasized in her concurring opinion,2 that the
Court took in Faragher.
What does all this mean? From what I read in the papers, it
has created a virtual stampede by employers to consultants and
lawyers ready and willing to write sexual harassment policies for
them. Very few, if any, of these cases have even reached the dis-
5118 S Ct at 2267.
Id at 2268.
Id at 2269.
w Id at 2270.
118 S Ct at 2270.
Id at 2271 (Ginsburg concurring).
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trict courts yet, much less the courts of appeals, so there is not
much else to report. The repetitive use of the word "reasonable"
in the affirmative defense, however, may make it difficult for an
employer to win summary judgment on this kind of claim, espe-
dally because the Court was clear that the employer has the bur-
den of proof on the affirmative defense. Beyond this, we are still
left with questions about how ghastly the environment has to be
before a plaintiff can recover - and the Seventh Circuit at least
has denied relief for some pretty awful situations' - and about
the impact of these decisions on co-employee cases, more conven-
tional sex discrimination claims, and fields other than sex dis-
crimination."
A different host of questions arises from the Court's decision
in Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, which recognized
that "same sex" harassment was actionable under the statute.65
Borrowing a phrase from a 1977 Supreme Court decision about
discrimination in grand juries, the Court reiterated that
"[b]ecause of the many facets of human motivation, it would be
unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one
definable group will not discriminate against other members of
[their] group.'s So far, so good: it is now clear that Title VII does
' See, for example, Koelsch v Beltone Electronics Corp, 46 F3d 705, 708 (7th Cir
1995) (denying relief for such incidents as: (1) employee stroking of plaintiffs leg, (2)
grabbing plaintiffs buttocks; and (3) company president telling plaintiff that he could not
control himself in her presence, because "[ilsolated and innocuous incidents do not support
a finding of sexual harassment"); Saxton v American Telephone and Telegraph Co, 10 F3d
526, 534-35 (7th Cir 1993) (denying relief when harassment such as employee rubbing
plaintiffs leg, attempting to kiss plaintiff, and lurching from behind bushes at plaintiff
had stopped, and therefore did not constitute severe and pervasive harassment); Reed v
Shepard, 939 F2d 484, 492 (7th Cir 1991) (denying relief for such incidents as: (1) em-
ployee handcuffing plaintiff to the drunk tank; (2) holding conversations with plaintiff
about oral sex; (3) grabbing plaintiffs head and forcefully placing it in employee's lap; and
(4) placing a cattle prod with an electrical shock between plaintiffs legs, because the
"showing that she welcomed the activity is fatal to her claim, particularly where [plaintiff]
admits that the 'harassment' did not adversely affect her ability to do her job"); Dockter v
Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc, 913 F2d 456, 460 (7th Cir 1990) (denying relief for such inci-
dents as: (1) employee fondling plaintiffs breasts; (2) repeatedly asking plaintiff on date;
(3) playing with plaintiff's hair; (4) locking himself in plaintiff's office while he stared at
her; (5) asking plaintiff to sit on his lap; and (6) attempting to kiss her several times, be-
cause plaintiff did not prove an injury "which can be remedied under the equitable provi-
sions of Title VI).
" On June 18, 1999, the EEOC issued new guidelines on the subject giving its view
on a number of these questions. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, En-
forcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervi-
sors, available online at <http'/www.eeoc.gov/docs/harassment.html> (visited Oct 1,
1999).
523 US 75 (1998).
Id at 78 (first alteration in original), quoting Castaneda v Partida, 430 US 482, 499
(1977) (holding that the existence of a governing majority was not sufficient to rebut a
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not have an implicit restriction allowing individuals to sue for sex
discrimination only if the perpetrator is of the opposite sex, or
worse, only if the perpetrator feels some sort of sexual attraction
to the victim (a rule that held sway in circuits that recognized the
claim only if the perpetrator was homosexual). But here, as in
Ellerth and Faragher, it is easier to state what the Court ruled
out than what it ruled in. In its effort to prevent Title VII from
turning into a general "civility code" - a prospect the Court
viewed with horror - it stressed that the plaintiff "must always
prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offen-
sive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'dis-
crimina[tion] ... because of... sex."' The Court actually went so
far in its opinion as to distinguish between the football coach's
friendly smack on a player's buttocks and the same behavior di-
rected toward his secretary back at the office. With touching con-
fidence in the lower courts, the Court concluded with these re-
marks:
Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social
context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish be-
tween simple teasing or roughhousing among members of
the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in
the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile or abu-
sive. 9
I hope so, but once again, for the short term this leaves litigants
without much guidance. That is probably a state of affairs that
slightly favors plaintiffs, because it will be difficult once again to
dispose of cases on summary judgment for some time to come. In
Oncale itself, and in a similar case the Seventh Circuit decided
before Oncale, ° the behavior was so awful that no one could have
mistaken it for "mere" roughhousing.7 Left open are the many
questions to which I alluded earlier about what exactly we mean,
showing of the significant disparity between the Mexican-American population in the
county and the number of Mexican-Americans summoned for grand jury service, which
established a prima facie case of discrimination).
Oncale, 523 US at 80.
Id (alteration in original).
Id at 82.
70 See Doe v City of Belleville, 119 F3d 563 (7th Cir 1997) (concluding that sexual
harassment of a man by another man is actionable under Title VII and the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, permitted the inference of harassment
based upon sex), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 118 S Ct 1183 (1998).
"1 See Oncale, 523 US at 77 (supervisors "physically assaulted [plaintiff] in a sexual
manner" and one supervisor "threatened him with rape").
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when we say someone has been discriminated against "on account
of sex." The Court appears to assume that help will come from a
different part of the analysis, namely, how hostile or abusive the
environment must be before it can be called discriminatory.
There is very little I can say about Gebser v Lago Vista Inde-
pendent School District72 except to note that the result there,
which was that Title IX recipients are not liable for the sexual
harassment of a student by a teacher unless the "district" has
"actual notice" of the harassment and is "deliberately indifferent"
to the teacher's misconduct,7 draws a sharp line between the pri-
vate right of action available under Title VII as a matter of statu-
tory language, and the implied private right of action under Title
IX that the Court recognized in Cannon v University of Chicago
in 1979.74 The Court will be taking another look at this area this
term, in Davis v Monroe County Board of Education,75 albeit in
the context of student-to-student harassment instead of teacher-
to-student.7' Groups all over the country have organized to try to
persuade Congress legislatively to overrule Gebser, pointing out
the even greater vulnerability a school child has to the authority
of a teacher than the vulnerability of a subordinate employee has
to a supervisor. If, however, Gebser remains the law, it is my
guess that student victims will look more aggressively to state
law theories of recovery against both the teacher and the school
district in question. In every other way, our society abhors such
behavior, and it would be surprising not to see either a federal or
a state response.
CONCLUSION
Neither society nor the legal system yet has a firm grasp on
sex discrimination - what it is, how great its incidence is,
whether it is serious enough to warrant severe penalties, and
what should be done about it. This lack of awareness can best be
addressed initially by working hard to communicate the reality of
the experience discrimination victims feel both to society at large
and more specifically to the courts. If judges believe - really be-
lieve - that they are dealing with a problem every bit as serious
as other forms of discrimination, then they will do a better job of
118 S Ct 1989 (1998).
Id at 1993.
7, 441 US 677 (1979).
120 F3d 1390(llth Cir 1997) (en banc), revd, 119 S Ct 1661 (1999).
76 See note 7.
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weeding the meritorious cases from the losers. Once they are
dealing with cases of arguable merit, the challenge passes to you,
the academics, and to the bar, to bring more clarity to the content
of the law. The fuzziness that we see at present is a symptom of
widely diverging views even among those who strongly support
anti-discrimination and equality principles. At some point, we
will have to stop finessing things and decide how far we can go
with the law of sex discrimination, and where we want to step
back and allow other social institutions to resolve these issues.
Even within the narrow legal realm, however, the Supreme
Court's 1997 Term has created almost infinite new employment
for lawyers and judges, as we work to fill in the blanks the Court
has left in our care. That task will go forward best if the courts
can draw not only on tight analysis of the cases, but also on the
broader thinking fostered in symposia like this one.
